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China’s Crown Theorist

Posted: 04 Dec 2017 05:55 AM PST

When, on October 25, 2017, seven men in black suits filed on stage in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to announce themselves as members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Politburo Standing Committee, only one face came as a surprise. It was that of Wang Huning, a longtime party ideologist and former professor of international politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. Few had predicted Wang’s rise to the highest ranks of the CCP, but now this once-reclusive academic, known for his quietness and caution, will have ideological authority second only to that of President Xi Jinping himself. 

Wang’s inclusion in the standing committee was a striking departure from the practice of recent decades. Standing committee members have traditionally been chosen from among prominent Politburo members with experience of serving as the party secretary of multiple provinces or province-level cities. Wang, however, came from the party’s Central Policy Research Office, of which he was the long-time director, overseeing development of the CCP’s ideological platform. The only previous occasion on which a theorist like Wang rose to the standing committee was at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, when Mao Zedong brought in his former secretary Chen Boda. 

The current situation in China is radically different from that of the 1960s, of course. But in one sense it may be meaningfully similar: changes in the national situation and the norms of elite politics seem to have once again brought the CCP to a historical inflection point. Riding a crescendo of increasing authority that has seen him named the party’s core leader, Xi recently launched his second term as president by announcing his theory of a “New Era” of socialism with Chinese characteristics, associated with the need to ensure social stability and high-quality economic growth while comprehensively increasing China’s national power. At the same time, Xi has repeatedly emphasized the Soviet-style existential danger in which the party could find itself, if it does not effectively promote feelings of faith and trust among ordinary Chinese.

Many of Xi’s policies-from the “China Dream” that is supposed to unite the aspirations of the common citizen with those of the state as a whole, to the radical anticorruption crackdown and the “Four Self-Confidences” that every party cadre must exhibit-have been aimed at reinvigorating and justifying the CCP’s authority. As the party pushes to consolidate its authority, what might the rise of Wang Huning say about China’s path forward in Xi’s “New Era”? 


In the years following Mao’s death in 1976, as the Cultural Revolution gradually gave way to the era of reform, countless Chinese citizens began to pursue the dreams that had been deferred during a decade of political struggle. Wang spent those years reading centuries-old political texts about the evil of human nature, the origins of the state, and the need for an all-powerful ruler to manage social conflicts.

Entering Fudan University in 1978 after taking an undergraduate degree in French, Wang went on to earn a master’s degree in international politics in 1981, writing his thesis on the concept of sovereignty in Western thought. The paper traced the idea of the modern sovereign state, from its earliest full articulation in the work of the sixteenth-century French political theorist Jean Bodin, who delineated a conception of “sovereignty [as] the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth,” through to its later elaborations, and then disavowal, in the twentieth century. Wang would repeatedly return to the theme of sovereignty in his books and articles over the next decade and a half, as he rose through the professorial ranks to become, in 1989, director of the international politics program in which he had studied.

Wang’s basic account of sovereignty agrees in important respects with those of its key Western theorists. Sovereignty, for Wang, entails the ability of a political authority to exercise unified administrative control over a territory without external threats or internal subversion. Bodin was the first to set forth a theory of politics in which the state alone held this authority, to the exclusion of any other political, religious, or legal power. Key to this conception was the premise that sovereignty is indivisible; although any policy or norm can be the subject of dispute, it is the sovereign’s role to put an end to such disputes. As Bodin wrote in his Six Books of the Commonwealth, “Just as God, the great sovereign, cannot make a God equal to Himself because He is infinite and by logical necessity two infinities cannot exist, so we can say that the prince, whom we have taken as the image of God, cannot make a subject equal to himself without annihilation of his power.”

For Wang, the historical development of such ideas was especially important because it showed that in early modern Europe, as in twentieth-century China, the modern state had had to fight to emerge amid the chaos of conflicting feudal forces and territorial and social divisions. The great European theorists of sovereignty, including Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, and Machiavelli (whom Wang saw as struggling to unify an Italy divided, as China later would be, into a “loose sheet of sand”), had been ahead of their times in seeing the need for a form of political organization that could produce unity and order out of weakness and confusion. In modern China just as in Renaissance Italy, mankind’s innate tendencies toward war and revolution meant that only shared obedience to a supreme authority could form the basis of national strength and independence. 

Of course, such ideas would have had a special meaning in the China of the late 1970s, after the disastrous experiments of the Cultural Revolution had weakened the state and called into question the ideological justifications for its power. But for Wang, early Western theorists of sovereignty had an eternal value because they had used a realist (or “materialist”) perspective to cut through the ideological fantasies of their eras and grasp what their societies really needed: strong, unifying rulers who were loyal to the people and unbeholden to any feudal, foreign, or religious influence. These strong rulers would in turn form the foundations of the stable and autonomous states that would go on to bring the West to the apex of global dominance.


The West’s ascent to global supremacy, however, would itself give rise to further changes. In particular, Wang was struck by one curious phenomenon. Why, as the capitalist countries had come to dominate the rest of the world, did they gradually turn away from the sovereign Westphalian state and toward more universalist visions of “global governance,” “human rights,” and the like? Wang explored this topic in his thesis, as well as in his 1985 essay, “On New Developments in the Modern Theory of Sovereignty,” and his 1987 book State Sovereignty, and other publications in the early 1990s.

Wang argued that it was no accident that Western countries had developed a distaste for state sovereignty and an interest in universalist ideas at the exact moment that they sought to consolidate control over vast colonial empires. Following World War I, with no more land to grab but a vast set of existing acquisitions to preserve, the colonial powers developed new international institutions such as the League of Nations, and new ways to justify their exercise of colonial or semi-colonial control over vast swathes of the world, including parts of China. At the same time, the ideal of national self-determination, which had been the last great advance in the traditional theory of sovereignty, was sidelined in order to preserve the international status quo. After World War II and throughout the Cold War, leading Western states continued to try to limit or control the process of decolonization, and often worked to suppress those who, in Wang’s view, truly represented the political will of Third World peoples. The United States’ continuing efforts to constrain the CCP could be seen, from this perspective, as part of a long tradition of Western attempts to maintain sovereignty over the non-Western world, while denying non-Western people any right to resist this domination. 

Thus, when the American political scientist Samuel Huntington developed his “clash of civilizations” thesis in the early 1990s, which held that conflicts between large civilizational groupings, such as the Confucian, Islamic, and Western worlds, would define twenty-first century geopolitics, Wang was ready to put an influential, party-friendly spin on the idea. According to him, the supposedly universal values of Western civilization were forms of “cultural expansionism” being deployed to infiltrate Chinese society. They could be countered only by a CCP capable of firmly asserting its own “cultural sovereignty,” a term that Wang adopted to refer to China’s ability to maintain its ideological autonomy and political unity against criticism from the outside world.

Tragedies such as the violence that followed the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square were, in Wang’s view, the natural outcome of allowing one’s citizens to be deluded by foreign influences that eroded the state’s authority and ultimately threatened to turn China back into a “loose sheet of sand.” Thus both China’s external sovereignty, or freedom from direct Western control, and its internal sovereignty-the ability of the state to organize society and prevent conflict between interest groups and classes-depended on the party’s ability to define and apply political and even moral values on its own terms, and to be obeyed. 

Wang’s arguments are essentially negative, framed around deterring potential evils rather than striving towards any positive vision. And although the CCP itself has increasingly sought to appropriate the rhetoric of traditional Chinese philosophy, very little in Wang’s work indicates any specifically ethnonationalist conception of the state.  What matters in his thought is not some Chinese essence but rather the ability of the state, and of the people whose interests it embodies, to neutralize any force that would divide and weaken them. Similarly, although Wang’s pre-Tiananmen writings did occasionally nod toward the need for moderate reforms, these were always placed in the service of and very much subordinated to the larger goal of preserving the state’s authority. Finally, even Wang’s applications of Marxism were invariably focused on justifying stable party power rather than gesturing toward the utopian society such power was nominally intended to bring about. No abstract concept, whether freedom, justice, equality, social harmony, Confucian benevolence, or even the dialectic of history, matters as much to Wang as the bare facts of authority, obedience, and order.


Wang’s preoccupation with sovereignty-and his suspicion of Western cultural encroachment-appeared consistently in writings throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1995, General Secretary Jiang Zemin and his associates Zeng Qinghong and Wu Bangguo invited Wang to join the CCP’s Central Policy Research Office to work on ideological issues. There, Wang helped draft Jiang’s ideological contribution to the party platform, the “Three Represents,” which articulated a new “representative” political function for the CCP that allowed it to justify including members from China’s burgeoning business and professional class. In the years since then, he has had a leading role in developing the signature theories of successive general secretaries, including Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” and the aforementioned “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Xi is the first leader since Mao to have his name appear in the party platform, and in him, Wang seems to have found for the first time a strong “prince”-of the kind Machiavelli sought-who can more fully put into practice his ideas about defending Chinese sovereignty and resisting the West.

Wang’s support for Xi will be bolstered by the fact that Wang has likely risen to his current position not because of his personal authority, but rather mostly due to the machinations of elite politics. In particular, as someone who has worked closely with all three of China’s post-Deng leaders, he is likely the only Politburo member that Jiang, Hu, and Xi have all found unthreatening or inoffensive. Previous party theorists, or “pen shafts” (biganzi), who have ascended to positions of authority-including Chen Boda as well as the later reform skeptics, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun-have similarly risen or fallen based on shifts in elite patronage. His awareness of these precedents provides Wang with yet another reason to ensure that his ideological contributions continue to justify unchallenged authority for the party, and for Xi. Indeed, since October, Wang has already publicly called for journalists to “unswervingly follow the party” and made comments to Chinese and Western tech leaders about the need to defend China’s “cyber sovereignty.”

Current analysis of Wang’s influence is divided between those who see him as a tried and true believer in “neo-authoritarianism” and others who detect a strain of cautious liberal sentiment in his scattered comments on the value of democracy and the rule of law to modern states. Yet it might be a mistake to seek his ultimate importance in any personal goals, whether avowed or “hidden.” Even near the apex of power, Wang remains subservient to the interests of the CCP. Barring any unforeseen crisis, his public work will continue to serve the party.  And indeed, it is Wang’s own theories that justify his subordination.


This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

Pickup Trucks: There is Way Hybrid or Electric Pickups Can Work

Posted: 04 Dec 2017 05:00 AM PST

Not everyone thinks an auto industry dominated by autonomous, hybrid and electric vehicles is going to work. Analysts believe there are certain automotive markets where it might not make sense at all, especially if those buyers are the hands-on types who like driving and use their vehicles for specific purposes — like pickup truck buyers.

According to Bloomberg, Ford might be taking a huge risk by pushing its cash-cow pickup truck, the F-150, into the hybrid- and electric-vehicle classes where few customers are asking for pickups. But Ford might have a sly-like-a-fox plan that could work that would provide extra value and benefits to the automaker and traditional pickup buyers.

The answer might be as simple as “more power.” That is, charging power.

Automakers coming to market with hybrid or electric pickups — most likely Ford and Toyota — can currently gauge the demand for them courtesy of VIA Motors. VIA has been using GM half-ton and full-size van platformsfor its hybrid-electric powertrains for several years now, and it doesn’t seem to be getting the traction in the marketplace that it expected. Reception has been lukewarm at best.

So why would mass-market truckmakers want to jump into that small and shallow pool? The key could simply come down to how well they market the truck and if the right manufacturer, like Ford — which sells more than 1,500 F-150s per day — jumps in to prime the pump with a hybrid or electric pickup. Truckmakers also would need to promote these vehicles as mobile power sources to buyers who like the idea of self-contained and self-reliant living. That could be the key.

If there’s a crowd that likes the idea of not having to rely on a bulky generator for camping, worksite chores or disaster relief, it’s pickup buyers. Automakers can hook them by offering optional bed-mounted 110/120-volt outlets. The setup could power houses during electrical outages or run the coffeemaker at a campsite. The technology could be packaged in a special trim level.

The benefits would likely outweigh the extra weight and costs associated with a hybrid pickup. A hybrid or electric pickup could be attractive to a small segment of buyers with the money and the need. An automaker like Ford could slice off a small piece of a highly profitable mainstream product to build something unique and technologically advanced — exactly what the Blue Oval did with the F-150 Raptor — to become a tech-leading company and benefit all the way to the bottom line.

What do you think?

Manufacturer image

What We Really Know About North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

Posted: 04 Dec 2017 03:40 AM PST

In January 2004, the director of North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center handed me a sealed glass jar with plutonium metal inside in an effort to convince me that his country had a nuclear deterrent. To make the same point last week, Pyongyang lofted a missile 2,800 miles into space and declared it had a nuclear-tipped missile that could reach all of the United States. Has the country’s nuclear program really come that far?

As global anxiety over North Korea grows and the war of words between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un escalates, it is more important than ever to be precise about what we know, and what we don’t, about Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and delivery systems. In 2004, nothing I saw on my visit persuaded me that Pyongyang could build a bomb and deliver it. But more recent visits, along with several kinds of open-source analysis, leave little doubt of North Korea’s impressive progress in producing bomb fuel, building powerful nuclear devices, and test-launching a wide variety of missiles-and its determined efforts to integrate all three into a nuclear-tipped missile.

Extensive experience with shorter-range missiles and 11 years of nuclear tests most likely enable North Korea to mount a nuclear warhead on missiles that can reach all of South Korea and Japan. That capability, along with massive artillery firepower trained on Seoul, should be enough to deter Washington. By my assessment, however, North Korea will need at least two more years and several more missile and nuclear tests before it can hit the U.S. mainland.


A credible nuclear deterrent requires not just fuel for a nuclear bomb, but also the ability to weaponize (that is, design and build the bomb) and to field delivery systems that can get the bomb to a target. It also requires demonstrating these capabilities-and the will to use them-to an adversary. There may be little doubt of Kim’s willingness to use a nuclear weapon if the situation required it. Assessing his exact capabilities, however, has been a greater challenge, even for the U.S. government.

Pyongyang has often aided such efforts by allowing peeks at its key assets. It has built much of its nuclear and missile complex in full view of satellites and routinely released footage of its leaders’ inspections of weapons and facilities. It has also allowed foreign, nongovernment specialists to visit those facilities. My assessment of North Korean capabilities is based on my own seven visits and ongoing analysis of all open-source information.

There are two basic types of nuclear fuel: plutonium, which is produced in reactors, and uranium, which is enriched to weapon grade in centrifuges. North Korea’s plutonium inventory can be estimated with high confidence because the design details of Yongbyon’s 5-megawatt reactor are well known, and its operation is easily monitored by commercial satellite imagery. International teams have inspected North Korea’s reactor complex during times of diplomacy, and I have visited the plutonium facilities and met Yongbyon’s very capable technical staff several times. I estimate that North Korea has 20 to 40 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for four to eight bombs.

Estimates of highly enriched uranium are much less certain. Centrifuge facilities are virtually impossible to spot from afar. Yet in November 2010, during my last visit, North Korea allowed me to view its recently completed modern centrifuge facility. (To my knowledge, no outsider aside from those on our small Stanford University team has seen this or any other North Korean centrifuge facility.) Based on that visit, satellite imagery, and probabilistic analysis of the import and production of key materials and components, I estimate that North Korea has 250-500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium-sufficient for roughly 12 to 24 additional nuclear weapons. (This assumes the existence of one or more covert centrifuge facilities, necessary for testing technology before deploying it in the large-scale facility I saw.)

North Korea also likely has the ability to produce a small number of hydrogen bombs. These require heavy forms of hydrogen-deuterium and tritium-for the fusion stage of the device, which is triggered by a plutonium or uranium fission bomb. North Korea has demonstrated the ability to produce deuterium and tritium, as well as a lithium compound, Lithium-6 deuteride, which can produce tritium in situ in the fusion stage of a hydrogen bomb’s detonation.


Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six underground nuclear tests. Seismographs around the world have picked up the tremors, allowing estimates of the likely explosive power of each bomb. Two of the most recent tests, in 2016, have had a destructive power of 10-25 kilotons, equivalent to the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The sixth test, on September 13, 2017, was 10 times stronger, with a probably explosive power of 200-250 kilotons-suggesting the successful detonation of a two-stage hydrogen bomb. (Pyongyang’s claims that its fourth test, in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb did not appear credible at the time.) A few hours earlier, the government had released photos of Kim with a mock-up of such a device. Though such designs are generally considered to be among any government’s most closely guarded secrets, North Korea has publicized them more than once.

This record of tests conclusively demonstrates that North Korea can build nuclear devices with the power of the fission bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as bombs with the destructive power of modern hydrogen bombs. Given that record, and estimates of nuclear materials inventories, I estimate that the upper range of nuclear materials inventories is sufficient for roughly 25 to 30 nuclear weapons, with an annual production rate of 6 to 7. (David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security has come up with a similar estimate: 15 to 34 weapons and annual production rates of 3 to 5.) This assessment is lower than a leaked U.S. intelligence community estimate of 60 weapons.


It is another question whether those weapons are small enough to fit on short- and long-range missiles. (Official photos of nuclear devices are strategically positioned in front of diagrams of re-entry vehicles, but there is no way of being sure that the photographed devices are really identical to those tested, whatever the claims from Pyongyang.) For many years, North Korea’s missile program appeared to lag far behind its nuclear advances. Although the acquisition and development of short-range missiles dates back to the mid-1980s, work on longer-range systems has started to speed up only recently. In the past two years, North Korea has test-fired more than 40 missiles, most of which were of intermediate or long range.

Today, missile tests are the most visible part of North Korea’s nuclear weapons quest. Successful launches are easily picked up by international monitors and featured in official North Korean photos and videos, many showing Kim Jong Un present and in charge. In July 2017, North Korea passed an important milestone with the test of two Hwasong-14 missiles-intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, that have a range greater than 3,400 miles. Last week, it tested an even more powerful missile, a Hwasong-15, with an estimated range of 8,000 miles, capable of reaching the entire continental United States. Such tests have been accompanied by diversification of North Korea’s missiles, allowing it to progress toward a stated goal of launching at any time and from any place, including submarines.

Such impressive progress at producing fuel, building devices, and launching a wide variety of missiles begs the question of whether North Korea can put it all together in a single package that can deter Washington. At the time of my 2004 visit, the leadership in Pyongyang may have believed that a handful of primitive bombs was deterrent enough. By 2009, it felt the need to conduct a second nuclear test to prove it had a working bomb. More recently, it has focused on missile delivery of growing reach. And this year, as leadership in Washington changed, it focused on a more ambitious goal: demonstrating the ability to reach the entire United States with an ICBM, possibly one tipped with a hydrogen bomb.

There is little doubt that North Korea could mount a nuclear warhead on a missile that could reach South Korea or Japan. But ICBMs require smaller and lighter warheads that are nonetheless robust enough to survive the entire flight trajectory, including re-entering the atmosphere. And acquiring that capability will, by my estimate, take at least two more years of tests.


How has North Korea, one of the most isolated countries in the world, been able to make such progress? It got some outside assistance.Beginning in the 1960s, the Soviet Union helped Pyongyang pursue peaceful applications of nuclear technologies and educated its technicians and scientists. After 1991, collaboration with Russian and possibly Ukrainian missile factories continued for some time, and North Korea has also taken advantage of a leaky international export control system to acquire key materials for the production of fissile materials, particularly for gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. But for the most part, Pyongyang has built its nuclear facilities and bombs on its own. Its program is now mostly self-sufficient.

After the most recent missile test, North Korea declared that it had achieved its “goal of the completion of the rocket weaponry system development” needed to deter U.S. aggression. Domestically, this was an important milestone, because the regime had stated in 2013 that it would develop a nuclear deterrent so it could turn its focus to economic development. With this achievement, will Kim be ready to engage in diplomacy with Washington? Although he needs more time in order to be able to credibly threaten the entire continental United States, the fact that Kim can already inflict enormous damage on American allies and bases in Asia may give him sufficient assurance to start a dialogue, in an effort to reduce current tensions and head off misunderstandings that could lead to war.

Washington should be ready to reciprocate-or if necessary, to initiate the discussion. Talking would not represent a reward or concession, or a signal of U.S. acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. It would instead be a first step toward reducing the risks of a nuclear catastrophe and developing a better understanding of the other side. Ultimately, that understanding may even help inform a negotiating strategy to halt, roll back, and eventually eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program.

This article was originally published on ForeignAffairs.com.

Trump’s jingoism is hurting US tourism industry, and costing US jobs

Posted: 04 Dec 2017 01:35 AM PST

When I wrote several months ago that President Donald Trump’s tirades against Mexicans, Muslims and other foreigners would hurt the U.S. tourism industry, many angry Trump supporters wrote to complain that I was part of an alleged media conspiracy to discredit the U.S. leader.

Well, the official results are in, and – indeed – Trump is really bad for tourism.

According to the Trump administration’s own Department of Commerce’s National Travel and Tourism Office, the number of international visitors arriving in the United States during the first six months of this year dropped by almost 4 percent from the same period last year. By comparison, international tourism globally rose by 4 percent during the same period, according to the London-based World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC.)

This is no trivial matter. Tourism is the United States’ second-largest export industry, supporting 15 million U.S. jobs, according to the U.S. Travel Association. For every 4 percent decrease in travel expenditures, 344,000 U.S. jobs are lost, the WTTC says.

International arrivals in the United States during the first six months this year fell by 30 percent from Middle Eastern countries, 16 percent from Mexico, 14 percent from Central and South America, and nearly 2 percent from Europe.

Among the few exceptions to the decline in foreign tourism was South Florida: International arrivals went up by 4 percent in Miami, and by 20 percent in Fort Lauderdale during the first six months this year. State officials tell me that it was because of an increase in flights to South Florida from Germany, Argentina and other countries.

When I asked WTTC president Gloria Guevara how she explains the decline in foreign tourism to the United States, she said that it’s a combination of factors. Among them is “the feeling by some tourists that they are not welcome” in the United States, Trump’s travel ban on people from several Middle Eastern countries, and a relatively strong U.S. dollar.

Interestingly, she told me that Mexicans’ tourism to Canada has soared by 53 percent this year. This is because, among other things, the Canadian government earlier this year lifted visa requirements for Mexican tourists.

While Trump vows to build a wall on the border with Mexico and offended virtually all Mexicans by saying that most of the nearly 6 million Mexican undocumented immigrants in the United States are “criminals” and “rapists,” Canada sent a strong message that it welcomes Mexicans. What a difference!

And Trump’s constant barbs against Muslims – as when he told CNN that “Islam hates us,” or when he re-tweeted anti-Muslim videos from a British far-right group earlier this week, prompting a condemnation from British prime minister Theresa May – are resulting in many tourists from Arab countries heading for Europe. Tourism to Spain and Portugal is reaching all times highs, WTTC figures show.

There is also evidence that the number of international students currently in U.S. colleges – about 1.1 million – will fall by 7 percent in 2018, according to preliminary estimates from the New York-based Institute of International Education (IIE.) The IIE report pointed to the “U.S. social and political environment and feeling unwelcome in the United States” as partly to blame.

The U.S. country brand is taking a hit under America’s first populist president in recent times. A recent Pew Research Center poll found that only 49 percent of those surveyed in 37 nations have a positive view of the United States, down from 64 percent at the end of the Obama administration.

I’m afraid that none of these facts will change the minds of most Trump supporters. Judging from their previous tweets and Facebook messages, they will call this fake news – even if it comes from the Trump administration itself – as they do with almost everything that doesn’t fit their narrative.

But there are some moderate Republicans who voted for Trump, and who may accept the fact that it’s not good for America when foreign tourism goes down, while travel to Europe and Canada booms. If they could just tell Trump to show more respect for other countries, and other races, they would do a great service to this country, and could help save hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs.



Andres Oppenheimer is a Latin America correspondent for the Miami Herald, 3511 N.W. 91 Avenue, Doral, Fla. 33172; email: aoppenheimer@miamiherald.com.



Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Joe Fournier refers to the FCC and the net neutrality issue.


Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Joe Fournier refers to the FCC and the net neutrality issue.


Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Nancy Ohanian refers to Republican double-talk favoring the rich.


Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Jennifer Kohnke refers to Twitter, Facebook.


Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Nancy Ohanian refers to Republican double-talk favoring the rich.


Posted: 04 Dec 2017 12:01 AM PST

This artwork by Kevin Kreneck refers to the GOP feeding wealthy fat cats with their tax reform bill.